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"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection. "1
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lockett v. Evans, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
death row inmates are not entitled to know the sources of drugs to
be used in their executions. 2 The controversial ruling came after
two condemned prisoners, Clayton Lockett and Charles Warner,
challenged an Oklahoma statute (Section 1015(B)), 3 which requires
* B.S., University of Texas at Tyler, 2009; J.D., Duquesne University School of Law,
2015. The author wishes to thank Dean Ken Gormley and Professor Ann L. Schiavone for
their thoughtful advice and feedback.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall, C.).
2. Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 491 (Okla. 2014).
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1015(B) (2012).
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state officials to keep those sources confidential. Following that de-
cision, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) adminis-
tered an untested cocktail of drugs to execute Lockett. 4 The execu-
tion went horribly awry when Lockett began to writhe, groan, and
convulse on the gurney before dying from a heart attack more than
forty minutes after the process began. In the aftermath of Lock-
ett's botched execution, Warner's execution was postponed pending
an investigation into what went wrong.6
Lockett's bungled execution spurred heated debate across the
country.7 Undoubtedly, few events invigorate debate amongst the
American public more than those relating to the death penalty.8 As
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts opined,
"[r]easonable people of good faith disagree on the morality and effi-
cacy of capital punishment, and for many who oppose it, no method
of execution would ever be acceptable."9 This brief article does not
wade into that discussion. 10 Rather, this article tackles the serious
legal issues surrounding Section 1015(B) in light of the Oklahoma
4. Erick Eckholm, One Execution Botched, State Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2014, Al.
5. Id. However, an independent autopsy stated that Lockett died from "judicial execu-
tion by lethal injection." Josh Sanburn, Oklahoma Death Row Inmate Died from Lethal In-
jection, Not Heart Attack, TIME (Aug. 28, 2014), http://time.com/3211135/clayton-lockett-au-
topsy-lethal-injection/. Prison officials reported that the medical issues were caused when a
"blood vein had collapsed, and the drugs had either absorbed into the tissue, leaked out or
both." Eric Eckholm & John Schwartz, Timeline Describes Frantic Scene at Oklahoma Exe-
cution, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/us/oklahoma-official-
calls -foroutside-review-of-botched-execution.html?hp.
6. Eckholm, supra note 4. Prison officials previously planned to execute Warner on the
same day and in the same manner as Lockett. Michael Winter, Okla. Killer Dies after
Botched Execution, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/na-
tion/2014/04/29/oklahoma-executions-drugs-lethal-injection/8476389/. Had Warner's execu-
tion occurred that day, the executions of both Lockett and Warner would have been Okla-
homa's first double execution since 1937. Id. Warner was eventually executed on January
15, 2015. Erik Eckholm, Oklahoma Executes First Inmate Since Slipshod Injection in April,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/us/oklahoma-execution-
charles-warner-lethal-injection.
html? r=0.
7. Erik Eckholm & Motoko Rich, Oklahoma Faces Sharp Scrutiny over Botched Execu-
tion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/us/oklahoma-faces-
sharp-scrutinyover-botched-execution.html?hp. The White House soon condemned those
who administered Lockett's execution for falling short of humane standards. Id.
8. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality) (acknowledging the controversial na-
ture of capital punishment).
9. Id. at 61.
10. This article does not analyze whether capital punishment is moral; nor does this ar-
ticle analyze whether Lockett and Warner deserved their death sentences. This article only
analyzes the state constitutional issues surrounding Section 1015(B), but not out of pity for
Lockett or Warner. This article was written to proactively promote transparency and public
confidence in the judicial system given (1) the controversial nature of capital punishment, (2)
the likelihood that issues pertaining to their case will reoccur, and (3) the relevance of these
issues in states with similar provisions.
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Constitution.11 First, this article suggests that Section 1015(B) vi-
olates the condemned prisoner's due process rights required by the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under article 11,
section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution. 12 Next, this article sug-
gests that Section 1015(B) violates the presumption of open court
access pursuant to article 11, section 22 of the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion. 13 Ultimately, this article concludes that Section 1015(B) is un-
lawful under the Oklahoma Constitution. 14
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Convictions
Lockett's conviction was a consequence of a series of monstrous
events that occurred on June 3, 1999, when he attacked, kidnapped,
shot, and murdered nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman in an at-
tempt to rob the home of her friend, Bobby Bornt. 15 Lockett was
charged with conspiracy, first degree burglary, assault with a dan-
gerous weapon, forcible oral sodomy, first degree rape, kidnapping,
robbery by force and fear, and first degree murder.16 At trial, a jury
found Lockett guilty on all counts and the court subsequently sen-
tenced him to death.17
Separate from Lockett's conviction, Warner's conviction was a
consequence of an equally horrific incident on August 22, 1997,
when he raped and murdered his girlfriend's eleven-month-old
daughter.18 Warner was charged with first degree murder and first
degree rape. 19 At trial, a jury found Warner guilty on both counts
and, like Lockett, the court sentenced him to death.20
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418, 421-22 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
16. Id. at 421. Lockett's accomplices included his best friend, Shawn Mathis, and cousin,
Alfonzo Lockett. Id. The men also attacked and kidnapped Neiman's friend along with
Bornt, and Bornt's nine-month-old son. Id. at 421-22. Lockett killed Neiman because she
would not agree to keep from contacting the police. Ziva Branstetter, Death Row Inmate
Killed Teen Because She Wouldn't Back Down, TULSA WORLD (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.tul-
saworld.com/news/courts/death-row-inmate-killed-teen because-she-wouldn-tback/article e
459564b-5c60-5145-alce-bbd17a14417b.html?mode=story. Lockett shot Neiman twice, and
ordered Mathis to bury Neiman while she was still breathing. Id. The other victims sur-
vived; however, the men also threatened to kill the other victims if they contacted police.
Lockett, 53 P.3d at 422.
17. Lockett, 53 P.3d at 421.
18. Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 856-57 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
19. Id. at 856.
20. Id. at 857.
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B. The Civil Action
1. Basis and Outcome
On February 26, 2014, Lockett and Warner filed a civil action
against the State in the Oklahoma County District Court.21 The
condemned prisoners challenged the constitutionality of Section
1015(B), which states: "The identity of all persons who participate
in or administer the execution process and persons who supply the
drugs, medical supplies or medical equipment for the execution
shall be confidential and shall not be subject to discovery in any
civil or criminal proceedings. '22 First, the prisoners argued this
provision "violates their due process rights by denying them both
notice of the process by which they will be executed and meaningful
access to the courts to challenge that process. '23 Second, they ar-
gued that Section 1015(B) is unconstitutional "because it precludes
judicial review of the Department of Corrections' lethal-injection
procedures and violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution by blocking Plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment."24 Ac-
cordingly, Lockett and Warner asked the court to stay their execu-
tion until the sources of the drugs to be used were disclosed.25
Weaving through a jungle of procedural obstacles, the case was
eventually heard by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.26 The high
court ruled against the prisoners, and held Section 1015(B) consti-
tutional by explaining:
The challenged provision makes secret only the identity of the
persons who carry out the execution and the identity of the per-
sons who supply the drugs and medical equipment necessary
to do so. The identity of the drug or drugs and the dosage of
the drugs are not covered by the provision. 27
21. Lockett v. Evans, 2014 OK 33, 1 (Okla. 2014), appeal denied, 330 P.3d 488 (Okla.
2014).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This article will only consider issues concern-
ing Section 1015(B) in light of the Oklahoma Constitution. See infra Part III.
25. Lockett, 2014 OK 33, 2.
26. See infra Part II.B.2.
27. Lockett, 330 P.3d at 491.
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In making that decision, the court considered whether the funda-
mental right of "access to the courts" rendered Section 1015(B) un-
constitutional. 28 This right "requires prison authorities to assist in-
mates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers. '29
The court noted that right of access to the courts does not allow a
prisoner to discover grievances, nor to litigate effectively once in
court. 30 The court also noted that, to establish an access to the
courts violation, a prisoner must demonstrate "actual injury-that
is 'actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litiga-
tion, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a
claim."'31 Because Lockett and Warner did not demonstrate actual
prejudice with respect to any contemplated challenges, the court
ruled that Section 1015(B) did not violate their constitutional right
of access to the courts.32
2. Procedural History
A short review of the history of the case illustrates the complex
procedural thicket traversed by the condemned prisoners' claim. 33
Shortly after the case was filed in state court, the State removed
the lawsuit to federal court.3 4 Lockett and Warner subsequently
amended their complaint to eliminate all federal issues, causing the
federal court to remand the case. 35 Four days later, the state court
dismissed the claim after finding that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion. 36 The prisoners then appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme
28. Id.
29. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
30. Lockett, 330 P.3d at 491 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996)).
31. Id. (quoting Casey, 518 U.S. at 348).
32. Id. Although he agreed with the result, Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Steven
Taylor characterized the prisoners' claim as "frivolous and not grounded in the law" in a terse
dissent. Id. at 493 (Taylor, J., dissenting). He reasoned that "if they were being executed in
the electric chair, they would have no right to know whether OG&E or PSO were providing
the electricity ... or if they were being executed by firing squad, they would have no right to
know whether it be by Winchester or Remington ammunition." Id. But see Kimberly New-
berry, Secrecy in Lethal Injection: How the Oklahoma Courts are Supporting a Deadly Double
Standard, JURIST (June 1, 2014), http://jurist.org/dateline/2014/06/kimberly-newberry-le-
thal-injection.php (arguing "[t]he problem with drugs ... is that it matters what substance a
person puts in his body").
33. Justice Taylor opined that "[t]his case has traveled a very long and complete journey
through full due process of law." Lockett v. Evans, 2014 OK 33, *5 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor, J.,
dissenting), appeal denied, 330 P.3d 488 (Okla. 2014). Although perhaps "complete," this
article suggests the result of that "journey" was misguided. See infra Part III.
34. Lockett, 2014 OK 33, 3. On behalf of the DOC, Oklahoma's Office of the Attorney
General removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma. Id.
35. Id. The amended complaint challenged the state's lethal injection protocol under the
Oklahoma Constitution and the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 2-3.
36. Id. at 3.
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Court by arguing that the lower court, in fact, had jurisdiction over
the matter. 37 They also asked the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
postpone their executions pending that appeal. 38
The Oklahoma Supreme Court then split the case by requiring
the Oklahoma County District Court to hear the merits of the law-
suit, and by transferring the postponement request to the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals. 39 In a written brief to the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals, the State acknowledged that, at
that time, the DOC did not possess the drugs needed to administer
executions.40 That court therefore postponed the prisoners' execu-
tions for thirty days, giving the State time to obtain the necessary
drugs or adopt another method.41 Meanwhile, the Oklahoma
County District Court struck down Section 1015(B), but denied
most relief requested.4 2
Pending appeal of the district court's decision, the prisoners
sought to postpone their executions for a second time in the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals, which eventually denied that re-
quest for lack of jurisdiction.4 3 The next day, the prisoners turned
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.44 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
retained the appeal on the merits, but once again attempted to
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 5. Oklahoma's district courts are courts of general jurisdiction. OKLA. CONST.
art. VII, § 7. Here, however, the Oklahoma County District Court erroneously denied "Plain-
tiffs' request for a temporary order, and request for a temporary injunction to stay the exe-
cutions of the Plaintiffs after finding that jurisdiction for such matters lies with the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals." Lockett, 2014 OK 33, 3 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Further, Oklahoma has a complex judicial system with two independent courts of last
resort: the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. OKLA.
CONST. art. VII, § 4. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reviews all civil and constitutional mat-
ters. Id. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviews all criminal matters. Id. When
an appeal is filed with the Oklahoma Supreme Court, that court may send the case to the
state's intermediate appellate court, the Oklahoma Civil Court of Appeals. OKLA. CONST. art.
VII, § 5. The court did not choose to do so here. Lockett, 2014 OK 33, 5.
40. Lockett, 2014 OK 33, 6.
41. Id. Additionally, the court dismissed the prisoners' actual postponement request as
moot. Id.
42. Id. at 7. The district court held the provision unconstitutional "as a denial or bar-
rier to Plaintiffs' right to access the Courts." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 489 (Okla. 2014).
43. Lockett, 2014 OK 33, 7. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals "determined
that its authority to issue a stay of execution is limited to a pending action in which a death
row inmate challenges the conviction or sentence of death." Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §
1001.1(C) (2012)).
44. Id. at 8.
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transfer the postponement request to the Oklahoma Court of Crim-
inal Appeals. 45 When the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
maintained its refusal to assume jurisdiction, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court ultimately agreed to postpone the executions as it re-
viewed the case. 46
C. Oklahoma's Lethal Injection Protocol
The federal government and at least thirty-five states use lethal
injection for capital punishment. 47 Lethal injection protocol origi-
nated in Oklahoma after legislators sought a potentially more hu-
mane alternative to the electric chair in 1977.48 At the time of Lock-
ett's execution, the DOC used a three-drug combination to admin-
ister lethal injection. 49 Within this common combination, the first
drug, midazolam, is intended to make the condemned prisoner un-
conscious 0.5  The second, vecuronium bromide, stops the prisoner
from breathing.51 The third, potassium chloride, halts the pris-
oner's heartbeat. 52 Protocol called for the drugs to be injected in
that order by an execution team consisting of three executioners,
each injecting one of the drugs. 53 According to the DOC, when that
45. Id. A federal public defender who previously worked on the case criticized the courts
for "playing hot potato with this case." Bailey Elise McBride, Okla. High Court Splits Exe-
cution Stay Request, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2014/mar/ 13/okla-sup-ct-sends-execution-stay-plea-to-occa/ (quoting Madeline Cohen) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
46. Lockett, 2014 OK 33, 8. On the same day that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals refused to assume jurisdiction over the stay request, the DOC filed an appeal re-
garding the portion of the district court's decision that declared Section 1015(B) unconstitu-
tional. Id. Accordingly, the DOC's contention placed the case within the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's jurisdiction. Id.
47. State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Sept. 1, 2014) [hereinafter State by State Lethal
Injection]. Those states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. The United States Supreme
Court noted that lethal injection is used "by every jurisdiction that imposes the death pen-
alty." Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). Of particular note, Connecticut, Maryland, and
New Mexico have abolished the death penalty, but repeal does not affect current death row
inmates. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46 (2012); MD CODE art. 27, § 71 (2012); N.M. STAT. § 31-
14-1 (2012).
48. Baze, 553 U.S. at 42.
49. Death Row, OKLA. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.ok.gov/doc/Offenders/Death
Row/ (last visited June 28, 2014) [hereinafter Death Row].
50. Id. There is no standard design to lethal injection protocol; some jurisdictions use
variations of the three-drug method, while others only use one or two drugs. See State by
State Lethal Injection, supra note 47.





protocol is administered, the execution team inserts intravenous
lines in each arm of the prisoner. 54 The execution team then injects
the drugs, in their respective order, using handheld syringes simul-
taneously into the two lines. 55 Prior to Lockett's execution, Okla-
homa had executed 110 prisoners using some form of lethal injec-
tion .56
D. The Purpose of Section 1015(B)
In 2010, a nonprofit organization known as Reprieve launched a
campaign against American pharmaceutical companies that sup-
plied execution drugs to states. 57 The organization openly revealed
the names of those companies to the public 8.5 In response to public
outcries deploring the companies for enabling states to administer
the death penalty, many of the companies stopped selling lethal
drugs to prisons, or placed strict limitations on purchasers using
these drugs. 59 Thus, facing a shortage of drugs to administer the
death penalty, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted Section 1015(B)
to alleviate the discomfort experienced by pharmaceutical compa-
nies that provided lethal drugs. 60 While the legislature enacted the
law for the purpose of insulating companies that supply execution
drugs from public scrutiny, the law, in effect, also insulates those
companies from judicial review and serves as a barrier to con-
demned prisoners who seek to challenge their planned executions. 61
III. ANALYSIS
A. Due Process: Determining Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Beyond the procedural complications of the condemned prisoners'
claim, the most obvious substantive issue is relatively straightfor-
ward: whether Section 1015(B) violates their due process rights to
obtain information relevant to their impending executions.6 2 Enti-








61. See infra Part III.
62. Oken v. Sizer, 321 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (D. Md. 2004). As a general principle, "[f]un-
damental fairness, if not due process, requires that the execution protocol that will regulate
an inmate's death be forwarded to him in prompt and timely fashion." Id.
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formation about the manufacturing location, pharmaceutical devel-
opment, and chemical ingredients of those drugs.6 3 In some in-
stances, a condemned prisoner cannot challenge a protocol for vio-
lating the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment with-
out knowing this information.6 4 Condemned prisoners should be
entitled to that information as a matter of due process, which re-
quires "an opportunity to receive notice of how one's rights will be
affected and opportunity to respond and be heard. ''6 5
Article II, section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution establishes the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.66 Specifically,
article II, section 9 states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punish-
ments inflicted."6 7 The language of this provision is almost identi-
cal to that of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, which states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted. s68 Oklahoma courts have acknowledged that these provi-
sions are nearly identical, and normally apply precedent from the
United States Supreme Court to determine whether Oklahoma's
use of lethal injection is cruel and unusual under the state consti-
tution.6 9 The United States Supreme Court has determined that
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires
63. Chester v. Beard, No. 1:08-CV-1261, 2012 WL 5386129, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2012)
(finding that information surrounding these sources is relevant to substantive analysis of
lethal injection protocol).
64. Id. Specifically, "understanding and evaluating the drugs used in a lethal injection
protocol is an integral part of this constitutional analysis, and identifying where the drugs
came from seems reasonably calculated to inform our understanding of this important issue."
Id.
65. Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
66. OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 9.
67. Id. At least thirty-eight other states have comparable provisions: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. ConstitutionalAccess to Justice Provisions, NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Administration/
State Links.aspx?cat=Constitutional%20Access %20too20Justice%20
Provisions (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). The only difference between the state
and federal provisions is the conjunction that follows the word "cruel" and precedes the
phrase "unusual punishment." The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008).
69. Bryson v. Okla. Cnty. ex rel. Okla. Cnty. Det. Ctr., 261 P.3d 627, 633 (Okla. App. Div.
2 2011) (stating that "these provisions are identical"); see also Malicoat v. State, 137 P.3d
1234, 1236 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
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criminal punishments to comport with "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."70
In other states where condemned prisoners have asserted that
their state's lethal injection protocol violates the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, courts have struggled to confront
those issues with uniformity.7 1 Some courts have invalidated lethal
injection protocols for violating the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.7 2 For example, in Morales v. Tilton, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
evaluated California's lethal injection protocol, which included
three drugs: sodium thiopental (also known as sodium pentothal)
to induce unconsciousness, pancuronium bromide to induce paraly-
sis, and potassium chloride to induce cardiac arrest.7 3 The Morales
court considered whether the protocol ensured that the condemned
prisoner stay unconscious from the sodium thiopental when being
exposed to the painful combination of pancuronium bromide and
potassium chloride.7 4 Ultimately, the Morales court quashed the
state's lethal injection protocol because it lacked adequate reliabil-
ity and transparency to ensure that the prisoner remained coma-
tose so as to not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.7 5
However, other courts have upheld similar lethal injection proto-
cols. 76 One year after the Morales decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered a similar issue in Tay-
lor v. Crawford.77 In that case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
evaluated Missouri's lethal injection protocol, which also utilized
70. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Federal law allows condemned prisoners to challenge a state's
execution methods, such as lethal injection, under traditional habeas corpus principles. 28
U.S.C.A. § 2241 (2012). Additionally, federal law permits prisoners to challenge those same
methods under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), which creates a civil cause of action for "deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," which includes
the Eighth Amendment.
71. Compare, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting
a three-drug lethal injection protocol for violating the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment), with Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007) (approving a pro-
tocol with that same three-drug combination).
72. See, e.g., Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
73. See id. at 975. Most jurisdictions use this protocol. See id.
74. See id. at 978. Both parties agreed that the contemplated dosage of pancuronium
bromide and potassium chloride would cause unconstitutional painfulness if administered to
a conscious person. See id.
75. See id. at 981.
76. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007).
77. See id. at 1078-79 (citing Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 973).
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sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chlo-
ride. 78 Unlike the Morales court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals concluded that Missouri's lethal injection protocol did not vi-
olate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment be-
cause the procedure did not present a substantial foreseeable risk
that unnecessary or wanton pain be inflicted on condemned prison-
ers.
79
To address the divergent justifications of lower court rulings con-
cerning lethal injection protocols, the United States Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of Kentucky's execution procedure
in Baze v. Reese.80 In that case, two condemned prisoners were sen-
tenced to death after being convicted of capital murder in Ken-
tucky.81 Subsequently, the prisoners challenged Kentucky's lethal
injection protocol, which is comprised of the common three-drug
blend: sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride.8 2 The prisoners argued that the risk of pain from malad-
ministration of the combination violated the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.8 3 The prisoners also offered an al-
ternative to replace the three-drug protocol, even though they con-
ceded it was untested and not adopted by any state.8 4
In deciding the case, the court established a difficult standard for
condemned prisoners seeking to challenge lethal injection proto-
cols. 8 5 First, a condemned prisoner must show that the challenged
protocol presents a risk that is "sure or very likely to cause serious
illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent
dangers. 86 Second, the prisoner must offer an alternative protocol
that would "be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact signifi-
cantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. 87 Ultimately, the
court ruled against the prisoners for failing to show "that the risk
78. See id. at 1074.
79. See id. at 1085.
80. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008).
81. See id. at 46.
82. See id. at 44.
83. See id. at 41. The prisoners conceded that Kentucky's protocol would be humane if
carried out properly. See id. at 49.
84. See id. at 41. The new alternative consisted of a barbiturate-only protocol "used rou-
tinely by veterinarians in putting animals to sleep." Id. at 58.
85. See Harvey Gee, Eighth Amendment Challenges After Baze v. Rees: Lethal Injection,
Civil Rights Lawsuits, and the Death Penalty, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 217, 218 (2011).
86. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
87. Id. at 52.
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of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal in-
jection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alter-
natives, constitute cruel and unusual punishment."88
In light of this decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court created a
potential inconsistency when it decided Lockett.8 9 In that case, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held "that the secrecy provision of Sec-
tion 1015(B) does not violate the inmates' constitutional right of ac-
cess to the courts."90 However, for condemned prisoners to demon-
strate a claim to the courts, they must know the sources of lethal
substances that will be used in their executions. 91 The failure of
certain execution drugs to work properly may cause agonizing and
excruciatingly painful deaths, which violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 92 Additionally, if adminis-
tered improperly, even legitimate lethal substances can cause death
row inmates severe pain and distress. Sources of execution drugs
may provide information regarding the purity, efficiency, and legit-
imacy of those drugs.93 Thus, condemned prisoners challenging le-
thal injection protocol must know the sources of their potential ex-
ecution drugs to contemplate a claim, and so that courts can accu-
rately assess those claims, under the Baze standard. 94
Mere knowledge of the names of the drugs to be used in an exe-
cution will not allow courts to sufficiently assess important ques-
tions concerning those drugs. 95 For instance, the full sources of le-
thal drugs should be revealed to allow courts, at a minimum, to con-
88. Id. at 41.
89. See Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 490-91 (Okla. 2014).
90. Id. at 491.
91. See Chester v. Beard, No. 1:08-CV-1261, 2012 WL 5386129, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1,
2012).
92. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55
B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1414 (2014) (arguing that "[ilf the state plans to use compounded pento-
barbital, for instance, the inmate can explain the dangers that the drug will be impure,
tainted, or otherwise flawed and therefore painful").
93. For example, "without proper anaesthesia [sic], the administration of pancuronium
bromide and potassium chloride, either separately or in combination, would result in a terri-
fying, excruciating death." Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 883 (M.D. Tenn. 2007),
vacated and remanded, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009). Specifically, failure to administer the
proper dose of sodium thiopental could cause a suffocation sensation from the injection of
pancuronium bromide, which paralyzes the diaphragm, and extreme pain from the injection
of potassium chloride. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008).
94. Baze, 533 U.S at 50-52.
95. See Chester, 2012 WL 5386129, at *2. Important questions may arise concerning the
chemical efficacy, potency, purity, or sterility of drugs at issue. See id. In Chester, the pris-
oners contended "that confirming the legitimacy and the bona fides of the supplier of these
elements is a critical component of any substantive analysis of this death penalty protocol,
since these supply source(s) in large measure may determine the quality and efficacy of the
drugs used in this process." Id.
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firm whether those drugs are approved by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA). 96 The FDA classification of execution drugs is
relevant to judicial inquiries because the FDA guarantees the au-
thenticity and potency of approved drugs, and courts may use this
information to confirm the effects of those drugs. 97 Yet, Lockett and
Warner did not even "know whether the drugs to be used in their
executions were acquired legally. s98 Limiting prisoners from ob-
taining this crucial information, Section 1015(B) stands as a barrier
to due process by preventing prisoners from asserting their rights
under article II, section 9.99
Many other states have laws or policies that are similar to Sec-
tion 1015(B). 100 These laws are especially troublesome given the
gravity of capital punishment.101 An offence as serious as a crime
punishable by death is the transgression of a state exploiting that
ultimate penalty.10 2 The Framers of the Constitution knew this.10 3
Thomas Jefferson, who did not entirely oppose capital punishment,
feared giving its operation to "the eccentric impulses of whimsical,
capricious designing m[e]n. °10 4 His concern was valid then. 10 5
96. See Nathan Koppel, FDA Takes Stance on the Importation of Lethal-Injection Drugs,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/04/the-fda-takes-public-stance-
on-the-importation-of-lethal-injection-drugs/. Although the FDA claims that "[r]eviewing
substances imported or used for the purpose of state-authorized lethal injection clearly falls
outside of FDA's explicit public health role," many lethal drugs are approved by the FDA for
other purposes. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See id. (referencing Megan McCracken, an attorney with the University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law's Death Penalty Clinic).
98. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Oklahoma Executions Back on, as Court Rules to Keep Lethal-
Drug Sources Secret, CNN (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/24/justice/oklahoma-
court-execution-drugs/.
99. Chester, 2012 WL 5386129, at *5 (observing that '"[t]here is a "special danger" in
permitting state governments to define the scope of their own privilege"') (citation omitted).
100. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-757(C) (2012); ARK. CODE § 5-4-617(g) (2012); FLA.
STAT. § 945. 10(1)(g) (2012); GA. CODE § 42-5-36(d)(2) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. 15:570(G) (2012);
Mo. STAT. § 546.720(2) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.2 (2012); TENN. CODE § 10-
7-504(h)(1) (2012).
101. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality). The United States Su-
preme Court has "expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any
other which may be imposed in this country" because "it is different in both its severity and
its finality." Id.
102. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to
United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., "the State, even as it pun-
ishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human
beings-a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity." Id.
103. See letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), http://found-
ers.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0210.
104. Id. According to Jefferson, "[d]eath might be inflicted for murder and perhaps for
treason if you would take out of the description of treason all crimes which are not such in
their nature." Id.
105. See Greg Tapocsi, Comment, Three Steps to Death: The Use of the Drug Pavulon in
the Lethal Injection Protocol Utilized Today Violates the Eighth Amendment's Protection
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Throughout the colonial history of the United States, judges "could
choose from hanging, drowning, beheading, and burning as meth-
ods of execution." 106 The Eighth Amendment eliminated many of
those methods after the American Revolution. 10 7 Nevertheless, Jef-
ferson's concern remains valid; scientific and technological develop-
ments perpetually cater to the "whimsical, capricious designing
man" in ways that the Framers may not have foreseen.108 Statutes
similar to Section 1015(B) leave open a door to the grave injustices
that may occur through lethal injection-with no meaningful re-
course.10 9
B. Presumptive Openness: A Need for Judicial Transparency
Aside from violating the constitutional guarantee afforded by the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, Section 1015(B)
diminishes judicial integrity and public confidence in the execution
process. Generally, the public and press have a right to access ju-
dicial records and proceedings.110 This policy of transparency in-
spires public oversight of the judicial system, which in turn fosters
confidence in the execution process. However, Section 1015(B) con-
fines necessary public oversight of controversial lethal injection pro-
ceedings, diminishing public confidence in the execution process.
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court held that the right of
the public and press to attend criminal proceedings is implied in the
First Amendment.1 Yet, even before that decision, Oklahoma
courts had recognized a broad presumption of openness in criminal
proceedings.11 2 Article II, section 22 of the Oklahoma Constitution
provides: "Every person may freely speak, write, or publish his sen-
timents on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right;
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press."11 3 Thus, by including this language, the
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 425, 428 (2009) (discussing
the use of capital punishment in seventeenth century colonial America).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Dawn Macready, The "Shocking" Truth About the Electric Chair: An Analy-
sis of the Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 781, 784 (2000). For
example, the electric chair was first used in 1889-more than a century after the states rat-
ified the Eighth Amendment. Id.
109. See Chester v. Beard, No. 1:08-CV-1261, 2012 WL 5386129, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1,
2012).
110. OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 22.
111. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
112. See Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. 1958).
113. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22.
624 Vol. 53
Unconstitutional Killing
drafters of Oklahoma's Constitution afforded all individuals a pre-
sumption of openness in criminal proceedings to protect their basic
and fundamental rights.114 Recent trends in case law also suggest
that the presumption of openness implied by the freedom of speech
and press extends to civil proceedings. 1 5
In Lyles v. State, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals con-
sidered the scope of this presumption.116 In that case, a judge per-
mitted television cameras in the courtroom during a criminal
trial.1 17 When the defendant appealed the trial judge's choice to
allow cameras in court, the appellate court held that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion because Oklahoma courts must be open
to every individual, including the press and public.11 8 The appellate
court reasoned that "freedom of speech and press is not a discrimi-
nate right, but the equal right of news gathering and disseminating
agencies, subject only to the restrictions against abuse and injuri-
ous use to individual or public rights and welfare."11 9
Importantly, that court noted that openness in criminal proceed-
ings "not alone affects the accused but the public also is interested
in knowing how their servants, the judge, county attorney, sheriff,
and court clerk conduct public business." 120 Therefore, Oklahoma
courts have acknowledged that the presumption of openness is so
important that it cannot be waived in cases involving public or com-
munity interest.' 2' However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lockett ignored the presumption of openness guaranteed by
114. Lyles, 330 P.2d at 739.
115. Reynolds v. Beacon Well Servs., Inc., 857 P.2d 74, 84 (Okla. 1993) (Wilson, J., dis-
senting) ("I would not deny litigants, nor the public in general, access to the judicial supervi-
sion and control of prospective jurors"); see also NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior
Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 1999) (concluding "that the constitutional right of access ap-
plies to civil as well as to criminal trials"). Although Lockett was a civil matter, the court
acknowledged the criminal origins of the case. Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 490 (Okla.
2014). Indeed, Justice Taylor considered the case to be exclusively a "criminal matter." Id.
at 493 (Taylor, J., dissenting); see also Lockett v. Evans, 2014 OK 33, *4 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor,
J., dissenting), appeal denied, 330 P.3d 488. Whatever the case may be, the presumption of
openness should apply because the public's interest in knowing the sources of execution drugs
outweighs the DOC's need to conceal them. Cf. Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identities: Toward
Recognizing A Right to Know Who Is Hiding Beneath the Hood, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791,
2795 (2007) (arguing "that the right of the inmate and public to know the identity [of the
executioner] outweighs the state and prison's speculative concerns on which the grounds for
concealment are based").
116. Lyles, 330 P.2d at 739.
117. Id. at 738.
118. Id. at 745.
119. Id. at 739.





article II, section 22.122 Pursuant to that case, the public, press, and
condemned prisoners are not entitled to crucial information about
the lethal injection drugs to be used in executions. 123
Guided by article II, section 22, Oklahoma courts should unveil
the sources of execution drugs because "the method of carrying out
a death sentence by lethal injection is a matter of public interest
and a matter on which the public should have the opportunity for
input. ' 124 Public scrutiny of these sources would cause the DOC to
evaluate the reliability of its lethal injection protocol, which would
decrease the possibility of failed executions. 125 Laws that enshroud
the sources of execution drugs in secrecy only frustrate the purpose
of article II, section 22.
Citing similar concerns, in the neighboring state of Missouri, sev-
eral news outlets have challenged that state's execution secrecy pol-
icy. 126 The lawsuit alleged that the Missouri Department of Correc-
tions violated state and federal law by refusing to reveal "the com-
position, concentration, source, and quality of drugs used to execute
inmates in Missouri. '127 According to the news outlets, publicly dis-
closing the sources of execution drugs "reduces the risk that im-
proper, ineffective, or defectively prepared drugs are used; it allows
public oversight of the types of drugs selected to cause death and
the qualifications of those manufacturing the chosen drugs; and it
promotes the proper functioning of everyone involved in the execu-
tion process." 128
The judicial transparency that the media is championing in Mis-
souri is fundamental to the American legal system. Judicial trans-
parency allows attorneys to consult litigants, plan litigation, and
advocate effectively on behalf of those clients. An attorney may
choose to challenge the legality of a certain execution drug, or com-
bination of drugs, that may turn out to be unlawful for the state to
administer. However, without knowing relevant information con-
cerning those drugs, the attorney cannot provide such counsel.
122. Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 491 (Okla. 2014).
123. Id.
124. Dunlap v. Dep't of Corr., 303 P.3d 572, 577 (Colo. 2013).
125. California First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, No. C-96-1291-VRW, 2000 WL
33173913, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000), aff'd, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining
that an analogous regulation was adopted in California to limit information about lethal in-
jections from reaching the media or public).
126. See Complaint, Guardian News & Media LLC v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., No. 14AC-
CC0251 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Cole Cnty., May 15, 2014). The plaintiffs to that lawsuit included the
Associated Press, Guardian News & Media LLC, and three Missouri newspapers. Id.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id. at 77.
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Thus, in the interest of administering justice, condemned prisoners
should be offered details concerning their execution drugs.
In a broader sense, without this information, news outlets cannot
properly fulfill their role as watchdogs of judicial ethics. This role
is vital to democracy; it fosters public awareness of serious legal
issues. 129 The authority of the states to adopt and administer the
death penalty is a high power of justice, and transparency through-
out the execution process is not expendable. 130 The media has a
duty to investigate these types of issues and keep the public ap-
prised of any potential wrongdoing by the state. Pursuant to article
II, section 22, Oklahoma courts should allow the public, press, and
condemned prisoners to know the sources of execution drugs.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a democratic society, the decision-making power of a state
must, at times, yield to a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.
The Lockett case presents such a situation.1 31 Unquestionably, the
terrible crimes of Lockett and Warner were inexcusable. However,
the political elements and emotional undertones of the circum-
stances surrounding the Lockett case only distracts attention from
significant issues concerning the manner in which the lives of the
prisoners would be taken.
Serious issues emerge with respect to the condemned prisoners'
claim when considered in light of the Oklahoma Constitution.1 32
First, Section 1015(B) violates prisoners' due process rights to ob-
tain information necessary for understanding and evaluating exe-
cution drugs under article II, section 9, which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment.1 33 Second, the presumption of openness in
judicial proceedings implied by article II, section 22 serves as a con-
stitutional barrier to Section 1015(B), which conceals critical infor-
129. Miles v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (E.D. Va. 2011) (stating that
"the mere fact of judicial transparency, by itself, enhances judicial accountability").
130. According to American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Executive Director Ryan Kie-
sel, "[m] ore than any other power, the exercise of the power to kill must be accompanied by
due process and transparency." Press Release, ACLU of Oklahoma's Statement in Response
to Tuesday Night's Botched Execution in Oklahoma, ACLU (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/aclu-oklahomas-statement-response-tuesday-
nights -botched-execution-oklahoma.
131. See Lockett v. Evans, 2014 OK 33 (Okla. 2014), appeal denied, 330 P.3d 488 (Okla.
2014).
132. See supra Part III.
133. See supra Part III.A.
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mation about execution drugs from the public, press, and con-
demned prisoners. 134 For those reasons, Section 1015(B) should be
struck down as antithetical to constitutional principles.
134. See supra Part III.B.
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